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EMPLOYER STRATEGIES FOR RECRUITMENT AND SCREENING:  
HIGH-PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS OR DIMINISHING RETURNS? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the effects of recruitment and screening methods on worker performance.  If high-
performance recruitment and screening systems exist, bundles of recruitment and screening 
methods would produce synergistic effects, increasing worker performance by more than the 
sum of the individual effects.  An alternative hypothesis is one of diminishing returns, 
according to which adding a second method to an existing one produces a positive, but 
diminishing, effect on performance.  Both hypotheses are definitively rejected by the data.   
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INTRODUCTION 
There is now a well-developed literature on high-performance work systems 
(Applebaum & Batt 1994; Cappelli & Neumark 2001; Ichniowski et al. 1996, 1997; Milkovich 
& Boudreau 1997; Pfeffer 2002; White et al. 2003).  The question asked in these studies is, 
what human resource management practices and forms of organizing work, when used 
together, improve organizational outcomes the most? 
Central to the high-performance workplace systems literature is the notion of synergies.  
Two performance-enhancing variables may be said to have synergistic effects when the impact 
of one variable on performance depends positively on the usage of the other.  Thus, when high-
performance systems are operative, the data must exhibit positive main effects for the two 
explanatory variables and also a positive interaction effect (in some disciplines, the term 
“moderating effect” is used in place of “interaction effect.”) for the two taken together.  Many 
studies have looked for synergistic effects of such workplace practices as self-managing work 
teams, participatory work practices, modular production systems, flexible job definitions, 
problem-solving groups, gain-sharing type compensation plans, and extensive labor-
management communication.  The performance variables in these studies include such 
workplace outcomes as productivity, sales revenue, costs, downtime, and defect rate.  The 
results are quite mixed: interaction effects sometimes have the correct sign, sometimes are 
statistically insignificant, and sometimes have the wrong sign.  In addition to the studies cited 
in the previous paragraph, the interested reader is referred to the works of Arthur (1994), Batt 
(1999), Delery & Doty (1996), MacDuffie (1995), Snell & Dean (1992), Wright et al. (1995), 
and the references cited therein. 
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The present paper looks at an earlier stage in the performance chain, namely, at the 
recruitment and screening strategies adopted by firms when they hire workers.  We begin by 
proposing a theoretical mechanism based on economic theory to explain the nature of synergies 
in worker selection methods.  The central idea is that when recruitment and screening methods 
are viewed as abstract mechanisms for generating information about a population of potential 
applicants, and when such information sources are mutually reinforcing, a profit-maximizing 
firm can bundle them together to better align the incentives of potential job applicants with the 
goals of the firm.  We develop the theoretical foundation with the aid of an illustrative example.   
Although there have been many empirical studies of the effects of various recruitment 
and screening methods on job outcomes (e.g., Bishop 1993; DeVaro 2005; Holzer 1987, 1996; 
Rynes 1991), only the study by DeVaro & Fields (2005) has included interactions of 
recruitment and screening methods in a model of worker performance.  The focus of that study, 
however, was not on testing for the presence of high-performance systems, and the authors did 
not offer a theoretical rationale for synergies in recruitment and screening methods.  In the 
present study, we ask whether certain recruitment and screening practices, when used together, 
generate higher-performing workers than would have been expected from the sum of the 
individual effects.  We term this the “high-performance recruitment and screening hypothesis.”  
In the absence of high-performance recruitment and screening systems, an alternative 
hypothesis is one of diminishing returns among recruitment and screening methods.  That is, 
even if the combination of two methods does not produce a synergistic effect on performance, 
it might still produce a “more positive” main effect than does the more important of the two 
effects taken alone.   
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THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
A theoretical foundation for synergies in employee selection methods derives from 
economic theory, in particular the behavioral assumption that economic agents seek to 
maximize some objective, be it profits in the case of firms or utility in the case of workers.  In 
this section we aim to clarify the mechanism by which this behavioral theory could create 
synergies in employee selection methods.  An illustrative example makes this mechanism 
transparent.   
Consider two selection methods an employer might use to hire a worker: requiring a 
sample of work and conducting a personal interview.  The employer could use either method 
individually or both simultaneously.  Basing a hiring decision solely on a sample of work, such 
as a writing sample, would very likely be a costly mistake.  Unless ownership is easily 
verifiable, weak job applicants are likely to behave strategically and submit work samples that 
are only partially theirs or perhaps someone else’s entirely.  Similarly, basing the hiring 
decision solely on a personal interview is not likely to be very informative in many cases.  The 
job applicant might be a fast talker, but under the time constraints of the typical personal 
interview the employer may well not be able to gauge whether the worker is qualified.  In 
summary, the personal interview used alone is likely to be only modestly informative in many 
cases, and the work sample used alone could potentially yield such bad information that it 
would be preferable not to do it at all. 
Next, consider the combination of the two methods, a selection bundle that includes 
both a required work sample and a personal interview.  Now the personal interview can be 
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more focused, centering on the submitted work sample and quickly resolving any questions 
about its authorship.  Perhaps more importantly, strategic-minded workers will no longer see an 
advantage in submitting a high-quality work sample authored by someone else, since they 
know they will be caught (and very likely humiliated) in the personal interview.  Thus, the 
lower-qualified applicants do not bother applying, raising the quality of the applicant pool and 
lowering selection costs for the employer.  Because the two selection methods are mutually 
reinforcing, the work sample becomes an effective screen only when it is combined with a 
personal interview.  Similarly, a personal interview is of limited value unless it is preceded by a 
required work sample.   
There is clearly a synergistic effect of combining the two methods.  Used individually, 
neither method is particularly informative; indeed, it is quite possible that the sum of their 
individual effects produces a negative outcome for the firm.  But used together as a bundle, 
their combined effect is positive, exhibiting a synergy.  It is worth emphasizing that the 
synergistic effect of the selection methods in this example arises because of the behavioral 
assumptions of optimization on the part of both workers and firms.  The combination of the two 
mutually reinforcing methods changes the incentives facing potential job applicants, dissuading 
the lower-quality ones from applying, thereby aligning the incentives of the workers with the 
goals of the firm. 
This illustrative example pertains to screening methods used to select from an existing 
pool of applicants, as opposed to recruitment methods, which are used to generate such a pool.  
Since our paper concerns both recruitment and screening systems, it might appear that we lose 
some generality by illustrating the synergistic mechanism via an example that only uses 
screening methods.  In fact this is not so.  Although recruitment and screening methods serve 
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different functions, in the sense that recruitment methods are used to generate a pool of 
applicants and screening methods are used to select from this pool, we argue that this 
distinction is somewhat artificial. 
Viewed abstractly, the employer’s hiring problem is to draw workers from the 
population of potential applicants in a way that maximizes profit for the firm.  In a world with 
perfect information this would be a simple task.  But in fact the employer has only very limited 
information about the population of potential applicants and, furthermore, this population is 
constantly changing.  Recruitment and screening methods can both be viewed as mechanisms at 
the employer’s disposal for collecting information about this population.  Whether this 
information is collected by attracting a sample of the population via recruitment methods, or by 
subsequent close scrutiny of the resulting applicant pool via screening methods, is immaterial.  
The employer is merely collecting the information that ultimately leads to a hiring decision.  
Viewed in this way, recruitment and screening methods are simply information-generating 
devices and, as such, we can view them symmetrically.  The synergy illustrated in the previous 
example pertained to two screening methods, but we could have easily chosen two recruitment 
methods or one recruitment method and one screening method to illustrate mutually reinforcing 
information-generating devices.  
  Although there is a strong theoretical argument in favor of synergies in selection 
methods, the behavioral theory is also permissive of nonsynergistic effects.  In some cases the 
information gleaned from two selection methods might be useful but not mutually reinforcing.  
One example concerns information sets that contain some overlap.  If two selection methods 
are both informative but contain some overlap, then we can expect their combined effect to be 
less than the sum of their individual effects.  This notion has been formalized in economic 
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theory by the concept of diminishing returns.  Even when two information sets are mutually 
reinforcing, suggesting a synergy, if they are also significantly overlapping then a diminishing 
returns effect could dominate the synergy.  The resolution of this tension must lie in empirical 
analysis.        
 
HYPOTHESES 
The first step in analyzing whether high-performance recruitment and screening systems 
exist is to ask whether recruitment and screening methods are in fact chosen in bundles or 
systems.  By a bundle, we mean a set of recruitment and screening methods that tend to be used 
together.  Simply observing that employers tend to use multiple recruitment and screening 
methods cannot establish the existence of recruitment and screening bundles.  The use of 
multiple methods does not by itself suggest anything systematic in the choice of recruitment 
and screening methods.  Rather, the question is whether certain recruitment and screening 
methods tend to be used along with certain other ones.  Accordingly, our first hypothesis is as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 1:  There are bundles of recruitment and screening methods that 
tend to be used together. 
The next question to ask is whether individual recruitment and screening methods can 
be shown to be associated with higher worker performance.  The notion that there exist 
recruitment and screening methods that, if used individually, will raise worker performance is 
the second of our testable hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2:  Some recruitment and screening methods raise worker 
performance when used individually.  
High-Performance Recruitment and Screening Systems 8 
If employers tend to combine certain recruitment and screening methods together into 
bundles and if some individual recruitment and screening methods are found to raise 
performance, the next question is whether these bundles are chosen in such a way as to produce 
high-performance.  A high-performance recruitment and screening system is defined as a 
bundle of methods that interact so as to produce a synergistic positive effect on performance, so 
that the effect of the bundle on performance is greater than the sum of the individual effects on 
performance.  This leads to our next testable hypothesis: that high-performance recruitment and 
screening systems do in fact exist. 
Hypothesis 3:  There are high-performance recruitment and screening systems. 
One alternative to high-performance recruitment and screening systems would be 
recruitment and screening systems that produce positive effects but not the synergistic ones that 
we label “high performance.”  That is, even if the combination of two methods does not 
produce a synergistic positive effect on performance, it might still produce a “more positive” 
main effect than does the more important variable taken alone.  We shall say that two methods 
combined produce diminishing returns when the return to using the two methods together lies 
between the larger of the two main effects and the sum of the two main effects – for example, 
when variable X1 has a main effect of 3 performance points, variable X2 has a main effect of 6 
performance points, and variables X1 and X2 together have a main effect greater than 6 but less 
than 9 performance points.  This leads us to our fourth testable hypothesis.     
Hypothesis 4.  In cases where the effects of recruitment and screening bundles 
on performance cannot be said to be synergistic, the relationship is 
characterized by diminishing returns.   
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Finally, it is possible that successful recruitment and screening methods differ by skill 
level.  That is, the payoffs to methods that are used to recruit and screen high-skilled workers 
are different from the payoffs to low-skilled workers and that certain combinations of methods 
may produce high-performance outcomes for one occupational group but not the other.  
Accordingly, we separate out workers in highly-skilled occupations from those in less-skilled 
ones and hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5.  Particular combinations of methods may result in high-
performance outcomes for one occupational group but not the other. 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
Our sample for the empirical testing of these hypotheses is taken from the Multi-City 
Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI); for more information about the data, see Holzer (1996). 
The MCSUI is a cross-sectional employer telephone survey collected between 1992 and 1995.  
There are 3510 observations in the data and the sampling universe consists of four metropolitan 
areas:  Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles.  The survey respondent was the owner in 
14.5% of the cases, the manager or supervisor in 42%, a personnel department official in 
31.5%, and someone else in 12%.   
Two thirds of the cases come from a probability sample stratified by establishment size 
(25%: 1-19 employees; 50%: 20-99 employees; 25%: 100 or more employees), drawn from 
regional employment directories provided by Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI), primarily based on 
local telephone directories.  The remaining third was drawn from the current or most recent 
employer reported by respondents in the corresponding MCSUI household survey.  Screening 
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identified a respondent who actually carried out hiring for the relevant position, and the survey 
instrument took 30-45 minutes to administer on the telephone, with an overall response rate of 
67%.  Sampling weights were constructed to correct for the complexities of the sampling 
scheme and weighted observations are a representative sample of firms, such as would occur if 
a random sample of employed people were drawn from each city. 
A substantial fraction of survey questions ask about the most recently hired worker, and 
these questions form the basis for our empirical analysis.  The key variables for our analysis 
include this worker’s employer-reported subjective performance rating, the recruitment and 
screening methods that were used in hiring this worker, and various firm characteristics.   
 
Measures 
Our analysis requires measures of worker performance, the recruitment and screening 
methods that were used in hiring, and characteristics of the firm.  We report descriptive 
statistics for the means and standard deviations for all of these variables in Table 1.  The 
definitions of these variables are as follows.   
 
Performance.  Our measure of the dependent variable, PERFj, is the employer-reported answer 
to the following question about the most recently hired worker in firm j:  "On a scale of zero to 
one hundred, where fifty is average and one hundred is the best score, how would you rate this 
employee's performance in this job?"  We use PERFj as a proxy for the performance of all of 
the workers who were hired by firm j in a particular time interval.  There are 2791 firms for 
which the dependent variable PERF is reported.  As seen in Table 1, the mean value of 
performance is 78, with a standard deviation of 22.5.   
High-Performance Recruitment and Screening Systems 11 
 
Recruitment Methods.  For each of ten individual recruitment methods, the employer is asked 
which one or ones were used in the campaign to hire the most recent worker.  The ten methods 
include posting help-wanted signs, running newspaper advertisements, accepting “walk-ins,” 
and soliciting referrals from various sources including current employees, the state employment 
agency, private employment or temporary agencies, community employment agencies, school 
placement officers, unions, and friends.  
As seen in Table 1, the most popular individual recruiting method is soliciting referrals from 
current employees, used by 82.2 percent of employers.  The fact that the sum of the means 
across all methods is much greater than one indicates a large degree of overlap in the methods 
chosen; that is, the vast majority of employers report using multiple methods.  In fact, the mean 
and median numbers of recruitment methods used are about four.  
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Screening Methods.  There are seven screening methods observed in the data.  For five of these 
methods, the employer is asked how frequently the particular method is used when hiring into 
this type of position (that is, the type held by the most recently hired worker).  The possible 
responses are “Always”, “Sometimes”, or “Never”.  These five screening methods include 
requiring a written application, requiring an interview, checking references, checking 
educational credentials, and checking criminal record.  For two additional screening methods, 
the employer is not asked about frequency.  The employer is merely asked whether these 
methods are used when hiring into positions of this type, with a “Yes” or “No” response.  
These screening methods include requiring a performance test and requiring a sample of work.     
Whereas the recruitment questions pertain specifically to the campaign to hire the most recently 
hired worker, the screening questions pertain to campaigns for workers “of this type.”  So if an 
employer reports that criminal record checks are “sometimes” performed when hiring into 
positions of this type, we cannot establish whether a criminal record check was performed for 
the most recently hired worker.  Since we can only be certain that criminal record check was 
performed for this worker when the employer reports that this method is “always” used, we 
recoded the first five methods to equal one if the particular screening method is always used, 
and zero otherwise.  We do not recode the other two screening variables, since these do not ask 
about frequency. 
Table 1 reveals that the most popular screening method is requiring an interview, used 
by 87.8% of employers.  As was the case with recruitment methods, use of multiple screening 
methods is common.   
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Firm Characteristics.  We incorporate a number of firm characteristics as control variables in 
our analysis.  These include firm size, number of sites of operation, the fraction of workers 
covered by collective bargaining agreements, and dummy variables for whether the firm is for-
profit, whether it is a franchise, whether it has any temporary workers, and whether it has any 
contract workers.  In addition, we use the following industry indicators:  agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing; mining; construction; transportation; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance; 
services; and public administration.  
             
Insert Table 1 about here 
             
 
Analytical Methods  
Our first hypothesis is that there exist bundles of recruitment and screening methods 
that tend to be used together.  The most straightforward test of this hypothesis is to consider all 
possible correlations of recruitment methods with recruitment methods, screening methods with 
screening methods, and recruitment methods with screening methods.  A correlation matrix 
thus provides our answer to Hypothesis 1.  Positive and statistically significant correlations 
imply that certain combinations of methods are systematically chosen together, supporting the 
existence of recruitment and screening bundles.   
Our remaining hypotheses concern the determinants of worker performance.  We test 
these hypotheses using a cross-sectional multiple regression structure, in which the 
performance of the most recently hired worker is expressed as a function of the ten individual 
recruitment methods, the seven individual screening methods, and controls for firm 
characteristics. 
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An interactive specification is crucial for our analysis since both the synergies and 
diminishing returns hypotheses suggest that recruitment and screening strategies affect worker 
performance nonlinearly.  In particular, the synergies hypothesis implies positive main effects 
and interaction effects, while the diminishing returns hypothesis implies positive main effects 
with a negative interaction effect within a certain range of magnitudes.  Testing either of these 
hypotheses requires an interactive specification.  Given the relatively small sample size and the 
large number of individual recruitment and screening methods, we are able to consider only 
two-way interactions.  Therefore, the performance equation we estimate can be expressed as 
follows:   
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Here, PERF denotes worker performance, REC denotes recruitment methods, SCRN denotes 
screening methods, and F denotes firm controls.  The equation includes 10 main recruitment 
method effects, 7 main screening method effects, 45 two-way interactions among recruitment 
methods, 21 two-way interactions among screening methods, 70 two-way interactions between 
recruitment and screening methods, and 15 controls for firm characteristics and industry 
effects.   
The performance regression provides the basis for empirically testing Hypothesis 2, 
which asks whether in fact there are recruitment and screening methods that, if used 
individually, raise worker performance.  To answer this question, for each method we consider 
the partial derivative of performance with respect to the individual method.  Since the 
performance equation (1) is nonlinear in the variables, the relevant derivative is not simply the 
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regression coefficient on the method in question.  Rather, the derivative is a function of all of 
the other recruitment and screening methods, so the effect of using a particular recruitment or 
screening method on performance depends on the values of all of the other methods.  The 
question then arises of where the derivative should be evaluated, since different points of 
evaluation could imply very different effects on performance.  Our method is to evaluate the 
derivative at the mean values for all of the recruitment and screening methods.  
We propose three possible tests of Hypothesis 3.  A commonly used approach in studies 
involving a multitude of human resource policies is to reduce dimensionality by aggregating 
the individual methods, either based on theoretical considerations or on statistical 
considerations such as principal components analysis; see, for example, Huselid (1995) and 
MacDuffie (1995).  This approach is standard in the high-performance systems literature.  In 
our context of selection methods, this would involve constructing both a recruitment index and 
a screening index, regressing worker performance on these two indexes and their interaction, 
and checking for a statistically significant and positive interaction effect.  This would be a very 
stringent test for high-performance systems, possibly obscuring a multitude of synergistic 
effects that might exist between pairs of individual recruitment and screening methods. 
A less stringent test of Hypothesis 3 involves estimating the performance equation (1), 
allowing the selection methods to enter individually rather than as aggregate indexes.  This test 
requires comparing the main effects of two individual methods to their interaction effect.  The 
notion of a “main effect” must be very carefully defined in the context of an interactive 
performance equation like (1).  Main effects are defined with respect to a pair of individual 
methods, such as recruitment and screening methods X1 and X2.  Let ∂PERF/∂X1 and 
∂PERF/∂X2 denote the main effects for these recruitment methods, and let d12 denote the 
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coefficient on the interaction term X1 × X2.  The partial derivative ∂PERF/∂X1 represents the 
effect of Method 1 on worker performance.  But this effect is a function of all of the other 
recruitment and screening methods, and the question arises as to where to evaluate the 
derivative.  We evaluate this derivative at the actual chosen values for all recruitment and 
screening methods except for X2, which is evaluated at zero.  Similarly, the main effect of X2 
on performance is defined as the partial derivative ∂PERF/∂X2 evaluated at zero for X1 and at 
the chosen values for all of the other methods.  Intuitively, the two main effects can be thought 
of as the effect of each method in a pair when it is used in the absence of the other method in 
the pair.      
Having carefully defined our notion of “main effect”, we can now state our criterion for 
our second and less stringent test of Hypothesis 3.  Two recruitment and screening methods 
display a synergy if the interaction effect is positive and statistically significant when both of 
the main effects are positive.  That says that using both methods together raises performance by 
more than the sum of the two performance effects when the methods are used individually. Our 
criterion for synergistic effects therefore requires that the following three conditions be met: 
  Stringent Synergies Condition 1.  ∂PERF/∂X1 is positive. 
Stringent Synergies Condition 2.  ∂PERF/∂X2 is positive. 
Stringent Synergies Condition 3.  d12 is positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
This test is less stringent than the test involving aggregate indexes, since it allows for 
synergistic effects between particular selection methods to be discovered if they in fact exist.  
However, the test requires that both main effects be positive.  It is possible to conceive of 
methods that, when used alone, produce no benefit or are perhaps even more damaging than not 
High-Performance Recruitment and Screening Systems 17 
using the method at all, yet are profitable for the firm when combined with other methods.  For 
example, recruiting by posting help wanted signs without any efforts to screen applicants could 
likely produce negative outcomes for the firm.  But posting help wanted signs is a very fast and 
cheap recruitment method that, if combined with careful screening, could likely produce 
positive outcomes for the firm.  This corresponds to a weaker notion of “synergy” that is not 
captured by our second proposed test of Hypothesis 3.  We therefore propose the criterion for 
our least stringent test of Hypothesis 3.  Synergistic effects require that the following three 
conditions be met: 
Less-Stringent Synergies Condition 1.  d12 is positive and statistically significant at the 
10% level. 
Less-Stringent Synergies Condition 2.  ∂PERF/∂X1 + ∂PERF/∂X2 + d12  is positive. 
These conditions say that the total effect on performance of using both selection methods 
simultaneously must be positive, even if one or perhaps both of their individual effects are 
negative. 
 Although we report the results of all three tests of Hypothesis 3, we believe for a 
number of reasons that the first test is too stringent and not as good as the other two.  First, 
there is no strong theoretical basis for grouping the recruitment and screening methods into 
aggregates.  Second, such aggregation could obscure potential synergistic effects, if they exist, 
in pairs of particular methods.  This could lead to a Type I error, or a rejection of the high-
performance systems hypothesis when in fact it holds true for some selection methods.  Third, 
our preference for working with individual methods, as opposed to aggregate indexes, derives 
from the basic questions a business manager would want answered.  A manager would want to 
know which particular bundles of individual methods produce synergistic effects on 
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performance, not which pairs of principal components indexes have a positive interaction 
effect.  
When two methods do not produce a synergistic effect, Hypothesis 4 states that their 
effect may be described by diminishing returns.  An empirical test for the presence of 
diminishing returns in recruitment and screening strategies must be carefully defined.  
Diminishing returns states that the return to using two methods is less than the sum of their two 
individual effects but is still larger than the larger of their two individual effects.  For example, 
if Method X1 raises performance by 3 points and Method X2 raises performance by 6 points, 
then Methods X1 and X2 together raise performance by between 6 and 9 points. 
For each pair of recruitment and screening methods, our test for diminishing returns 
relies on comparing two main effects from the performance regression and their interaction 
effect.  For example, consider the bundle consisting of the pair X1 and X2 from (1).  Our 
criterion for diminishing returns requires that the following four conditions be met: 
Diminishing Returns Condition 1.  ∂PERF/∂X1 is positive. 
Diminishing Returns Condition 2.  ∂PERF/∂X2 is positive. 
Diminishing Returns Condition 3.  d12 is negative and statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
Diminishing Returns Condition 4.  The larger of ∂PERF/∂X1 and ∂PERF/∂X2 is less 
than (∂PERF/∂X1 + ∂PERF/∂X2 + d12). 
Finally, Hypothesis 5 states that particular combinations of methods may result in high-
performance outcomes for one occupational group but not the other. We test this hypothesis by 
dividing the full sample into two occupational sub-samples and repeating the preceding tests. 
 
High-Performance Recruitment and Screening Systems 19 
RESULTS 
The correlation matrix of all seventeen recruitment and screening methods is presented 
in Table 2.  A large number of pairs of methods are found to have positive and statistically 
significant correlations at the five percent level in all three panels of the table:  the recruitment-
recruitment correlations, the screening-screening correlations, and the recruitment-screening 
correlations.  There are only a small number of statistically significant negative correlations, 
and all but two of these are in the recruitment-screening panel.  This provides strong support 
for Hypothesis 1, that recruitment and screening methods tend to be used together in bundles.   
             
Insert Table 2 about here 
             
We then estimated the performance regression (1) using ordinary least squares, 
computed the partial derivative of performance with respect to each of the recruitment and 
screening methods, evaluating this derivative at the means of all of the methods, and calculated 
standard errors using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications.  These results are reported in Table 
3.  The results indicate that some recruitment and screening methods individually raise 
performance, providing evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.  However, none of these positive 
effects is estimated very precisely.  Only one of the screening methods achieves statistical 
significance at conventional levels.  Nevertheless, the point estimates reflect our best estimate 
of the effect of an individual method on performance, and we find that a number of recruitment 
methods (help wanted advertising, current employee referrals, private employment agency 
referrals, and referrals from schools) and a number of screening methods (requiring interviews, 
checking references, checking educational credentials, checking criminal record, and requiring 
work samples) raise performance.  The point estimates, therefore, provide evidence in support 
of Hypothesis 2. 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
             
We come now to our three tests of the high-performance or synergies Hypothesis 3.  
The first and most stringent test involves constructing indexes for recruitment and screening on 
the basis of statistical, as opposed to theoretical, considerations.  Table 4 reports the results of a 
principal components analysis of the ten recruitment methods and the seven screening methods.  
For both recruitment and screening we present all principal components, their cumulative share, 
and the scoring coefficients associated with the first principal component.  We have argued that 
there is no strong theoretical basis on which to aggregate the individual methods into indexes, 
and Table 4 confirms that there is no strong statistical basis for aggregation either.  Both for 
recruitment and screening, the first principal component accounts for less than a quarter of the 
total variation.  Furthermore, the cumulative shares indicate that for neither recruitment nor 
screening would a small subset of principal components account for most of the variation.  We 
conclude that we lack both a theoretical and a statistical basis for reducing the dimensionality 
of the problem.  Nevertheless, if one were to proceed with the most stringent test of Hypothesis 
3, on the basis of indexes constructed from the first principal components of recruitment and 
screening, RECPC and SCRNPC, the following regression would result with standard errors in 
parentheses: 
 
PERF = 78.251 – 0.933(RECPC) + 1.009(SCRNPC) + 0.168(RECPC × SCRNPC) 
              (0.467)   (0.319)                 (0.334)                   (0.203)  
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The interaction effect in this regression is positive but is far from statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  If this stringent test of the high-performance systems hypothesis were to 
be believed, it would herald a strong rejection of the hypothesis. 
             
Insert Table 4 about here 
             
The results of our two less stringent tests of Hypothesis 3 are reported in Table 5, 
displaying main effects and interaction effects for all pairs of recruitment and screening 
methods for which the interaction effect is statistically significant at the ten percent level.  We 
restrict our attention to these pairs since they are the only ones for which we could potentially 
identify either a synergy or a case of diminishing returns.  In fact, Hypothesis 3 is definitively 
rejected by the data using our second test criterion.  There is not a single case of two positive 
main effects and a positive and statistically significant interaction effect.  This is a strong 
rejection of the idea of high-performance recruitment and screening systems.  Our least 
stringent test of Hypothesis 3 reveals only weak support for high-performance systems.  Of all 
pairs of methods that exhibit a statistically significant interaction, only three satisfy the 
conditions for our least stringent test of Hypothesis 3.  These pairs are:  recruitment through 
union referral and state employment agencies, screening through requiring work samples and 
personal interviews, and recruiting through newspaper advertising and screening by checking 
the applicant’s criminal record.  We conclude that the collective evidence in favor of 
Hypothesis 3 is extremely weak.  Only the least stringent of our three proposed tests identifies 
any synergies at all, and even that test identifies only three.   
Hypothesis 4 -- that recruitment and screening bundles that are not synergistic are 
characterized by diminishing returns -- is also strongly rejected by the data, as seen in Table 5.  
High-Performance Recruitment and Screening Systems 22 
There is not a single pair of recruitment and screening methods for which our four criteria for 
defining diminishing returns are met.  Thus, neither synergistic high-performance recruitment 
and screening systems nor diminishing returns appears in the full sample. 
              
Insert Table 5 about here 
             
Our final hypothesis concerns occupational differences.  While the full sample spans all 
worker types and skill levels, it is likely that successful recruitment and screening strategies 
differ by skill level.  That is, the payoffs to the methods that are used to recruit and screen high-
skilled workers may be different from the payoffs for low-skilled workers.  If this is so, then 
the performance regression (equation 1) could give weak results if estimated on the full sample.  
This may be why we found no evidence of high-performance recruitment and screening 
systems in our data.  If there are high-performance systems for hiring low-skilled workers but 
these differ from those that exist for hiring high-skilled workers, then if both types of workers 
are pooled, the regression results could obscure the existence of different types of high-
performance systems.   
The same argument applies to tests of the hypothesis of diminishing returns.  The 
combinations of recruitment and screening methods that exhibit diminishing returns for 
workers in low-skilled occupations might differ dramatically from those that exhibit 
diminishing returns for those in high-skilled occupations, so that no such effect is discernible in 
the cross section.  Therefore, Hypotheses 3 and 4 cannot be convincingly rejected by the data 
unless the patterns observed in Table 5 also hold in sub-samples disaggregated by occupation.  
To test this conjecture, which is our Hypothesis 5, we created two occupational sub-
samples and re-estimated the performance regression on each.  The MCSUI data include a 
question asking the employer about the type of job into which the most recently hired worker 
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was hired.  Responses were coded according to the 1980 Standard Occupational Classification, 
from the two to four digit level.  We categorized each observation into four occupational 
groups, in roughly descending level of skill: 
Occupation 1:  Administrative, engineering, scientific, teaching, and related 
occupations, including creative artists, 
Occupation 2:  Technical, clerical, sales, and related occupations; precision production, 
craft and repair, 
Occupation 3:  Service occupations, including military occupations, 
Occupation 4:  Operators, fabricators, laborers; farming, forestry, fishing, and hunting 
occupations. 
Given the large number of independent variables in the performance equation (1) and the 
relatively small number of observations in the four sub-samples, we combined occupations 1 
and 2 into a “high-skilled” occupational sub-sample and occupations 3 and 4 into a “low-
skilled” occupational sub-sample.  Table 6 reports the results for high-skilled occupations and 
Table 7 reports the results for low-skilled occupations.  These tables produce the same results 
as Table 5, which pertained to the full sample.  Tables 6 and 7 reveal that Hypothesis 3 -- that 
high-performance systems exist in recruitment and screening -- is strongly rejected.  In no case 
is a positive and statistically significant interaction effect accompanied by two positive main 
effects.  Thus, the pattern observed in the full sample persists in both of the occupational sub-
samples.  Tables 6 and 7 also reveal that Hypothesis 4 -- that recruitment and screening bundles 
that are not characterized as high-performance systems can be said to exhibit positive but 
diminishing returns -- is strongly rejected.  In no case do we observe two positive main effects 
and a positive total effect that exceeds the larger of the two main effects in magnitude.   
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Insert Table 6 about here 
             
             
Insert Table 7 about here 
             
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our starting point was the hypothesis that high-performance recruitment and screening 
systems, or synergies, exist whereby the combination of two recruitment and screening 
methods increases worker performance by more than the sum of their individual effects.  We 
find no evidence of such synergies.  In considering all two-way interactions, in most cases the 
combination of two methods increases performance by less than the two methods used 
individually.  In some cases the combination actually decreases performance even though the 
individual methods increase performance when used alone. 
In this context of recruitment and screening, we have extended the previous literature on 
high-performance systems by considering the possibility of diminishing returns, whereby the 
simultaneous use of two methods has a dampened (but still positive) effect on performance, 
relative to the sum of their individual effects.  This hypothesis is also rejected by our data 
because the magnitude of the negative interaction term is always large enough to render the 
total effect of the bundle on worker performance smaller than one or both of the main effects. 
Another potential explanation for our findings is that the payoffs vary depending on 
applicant quality or skill level.  To explore this possibility, we divided the data into high-skilled 
and low-skilled occupational sub-samples and repeated the analysis.  We found that, as 
expected, the recruitment and screening methods that affect performance differ between 
occupational groups.  That is, the combinations of methods that appear in the first two columns 
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of Table 6, for high-skilled occupations, differ from those of Table 7 (low-skilled occupations).  
Nevertheless, our tests of Hypotheses 3 and 4 yielded identical results in the occupational sub-
samples that were found in the full sample.  We therefore conclude that the rejection of these 
hypotheses in our main set of results is not simply an artifact of the omission of occupational 
skill level from our analysis.  In short, we find strong evidence against both the hypotheses of 
high-performance systems and of diminishing returns. 
If recruitment and screening bundles do not create synergistic high-performance 
systems, and if they are not characterized by positive but diminishing returns, then how can 
they be understood?  A clear and consistent pattern emerges from the data.  As revealed in 
Table 5, it is usually the case that a statistically significant interaction effect is of the opposite 
sign as the main effects, and that it is large in magnitude.  That is, two positive main effects are 
typically accompanied by a negative interaction effect, and this interaction effect is large 
enough so that the recruitment and screening bundle cannot be described by diminishing 
returns.  In other words, adding another method to an existing method actually reduces the total 
effect on performance.  This pattern of an interaction effect differing in sign from the main 
effects is also upheld in both occupational sub-samples, as seen in Tables 6 and 7. 
It is tempting to conclude from this analysis that bundling of recruitment and screening 
methods does not pay.  This would be too strong.  In fact, our results indicate only that 
bundling does not pay in terms of raising worker performance.  Why then do employers use 
multiple recruitment and screening methods?  It may be to achieve objectives other than worker 
performance, such as hiring speed.  Although we cannot explore this possibility using our data, 
we view it as a plausible explanation for our findings and believe that an extension of our 
analysis to incorporate data on the quantities of workers hired in recruitment campaigns would 
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be a promising direction for future research.  It is possible that when the analysis accounts for 
multiple employer objectives, bundles of recruitment and screening methods might be high-
performing systems or exhibit diminishing returns in dimensions other than performance.   
We see this paper as an important first step in the direction of testing for high-
performance systems and diminishing returns in recruitment and screening, but further research 
is required before conclusions regarding high-performance recruitment and screening systems 
can be drawn with any confidence.  Our work establishes some initial findings and charts out a 
course for future research on hiring systems, in what was until now completely uncharted 
terrain.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation
Performance 78.27 22.35 
Recruitment Methods: 
Help wanted 0.26 0.77 
Newspaper advertisements 0.49 0.83 
Walk-ins 0.66 0.82 
Current employees 0.82 0.59 
State employment agency 0.35 0.82 
Private employment agency 0.22 0.72 
Community employment agency 0.28 0.80 
School referrals 0.40 0.86 
Union referrals 0.07 0.37 
Friends 0.38 0.84 
Screening Methods: 
Application 0.82 0.56 
Interview 0.88 0.48 
Reference check 0.76 0.56 
Education check 0.38 0.80 
Criminal record check 0.32 0.70 
Test 0.31 0.76 
Work sample 0.21 0.65 
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Firm Characteristics: 
For profit 0.76 0.82 
Franchise 0.06 0.33 
Number of Sites 60.43 439.83 
Size1 655.92 13470.85 
Union 17.26 58.21 
Temps 0.36 0.85 
Contracts 0.30 0.73 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.00 0.01 
Mining 0.01 0.16 
Transportation 0.06 0.43 
Wholesale Trade 0.08 0.58 
Retail Trade 0.15 0.51 
Finances 0.07 0.34 
Services 0.40 0.85 
Public Administration 0.01 0.15 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix of Recruitment and Screening Methodsa
 Recruitment Method Screening Method 
                1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
Recruitment Method        
Help Wanted Signs                 1.00 
Newspaper Ads                 0.09* 1.00
Walk-ins                0.11* 0.23* 1.00
Current Employees 0.03* 0.09* 0.16* 1.00              
State Employment 
Agencies 
0.30* 0.20* 0.24* 0.24* 1.00             
Private Employment 
Agencies 
0.05 0.10 -0.05 0.17* 0.38* 1.00            
Community 
Employment Agencies 
0.19* 0.09* 0.20* 0.26* 0.51* 0.35* 1.00           
School Referrals 0.23* 0.11* 0.19* 0.22* 0.38* 0.25* 0.45* 1.00          
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Union Referrals          -0.03 -0.04 0.13* 0.08* 0.10* 0.13* 0.20* 0.04* 1.00
Friends 0.05 -0.11 -0.36 -0.11 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 0.06* -0.07 1.00        
Screening Method        
Application         0.10* 0.09* 0.02* 0.07* 0.15* 0.11* 0.22* 0.22* -0.04 0.13 1.00
Interview       0.05 -0.05 -0.12 -0.03 -0.15* 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.16* 1.00
Reference Check 0.05* 0.10* -0.18* 0.06* 0.04 0.13 0.19* 0.20* 0.02 0.14 0.18* 0.13* 1.00     
Education Check 0.01 0.02 -0.25* -0.08 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.26* -0.00 0.38* 0.17* 0.16* 0.30* 1.00    
Criminal Record Check -0.08 -0.03 0.16* 0.11* -0.08* 0.02 0.07* 0.13* 0.14* -0.14 0.09* -0.02 0.04* 0.024* 1.00   
Test   -0.07 0.060.12* 0.05 -0.00* 0.15* -0.09* -0.10 0.12 0.03*-0.16  -0.12-0.05 -0.10 0.23* 1.00
Work Sample -0.15 -0.19 -0.16* -0.10 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 0.00 0.16 0.26* -0.09* 0.06 0.04 0.15* -0.11 -0.02* 1.00 
* p < .05 
a1. Help Wanted Signs     2. Newspaper Advertisements     3. Walk-ins     4. Current Employees     5. State Employment Agencies      
6. Private Employment Agencies     7. Community Employment Agencies     8. School Referrals    9. Union Referrals     10. Friends      
11. Application     12. Interview     13. Reference Check     14. Education Check 
15. Criminal Record Check     16. Test     17. Work Sample 
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TABLE 3 
Effects of Recruitment, Screening, and Firm Characteristics on Performancea,b,c
 Estimate Standard Error
Recruitment Method 
Help wanted adv. 0.19 1.08 
Newspaper adv. -1.36 0.84 
Walk-ins -4.06** 1.00 
Current employees 0.59 1.40 
State employment agency -0.20 4.93 
Private employment agency 1.09 1.04 
Community employment agency -2.90** 1.22 
School referral 1.09 0.94 
Union referral -2.16 2.23 
Friends -0.29 0.88 
Screening Method 
Application -2.28* 1.24 
Interview 0.71 1.32 
Reference check 1.48 1.16 
Education check 1.25 0.98 
Criminal record check 1.61* 0.97 
Test -1.06 0.93 
Work sample 1.33 1.24 
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Firm Characteristics 
For Profit -3.24** 1.19 
Franchise -1.63 1.50 
Number of sites 0.00 0.00 
Size1 0.00 0.00 
Union 0.001 0.01 
Temps -1.64** 0.81 
Contract -0.87 0.90 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing -7.86 8.34 
Mining 1.27 4.37 
Transportation 0.02 1.93 
Wholesale trade 0.40 1.46 
Retail trade 2.45** 1.14 
Finance -3.07* 1.73 
Services 1.13 1.07 
Public administration -7.18** 3.51 
Constant 86.55** 3.31 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
a Recruitment method effects are the average change in performance with respect to an 
individual recruitment method.  Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. 
b Screening method effects are the difference in performance varying a particular screening 
method, holding other screening methods constant.  That is, we compute the performance level 
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of the most recently hired worker when a screening method is used and subtract from it the 
performance level when that particular method is not used.  Other recruitment and screening 
methods entering the performance equation are evaluated at their means, and standard errors 
are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. 
c Firm characteristic effects are the firm control coefficients, gi,, from estimating equation (1).  
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TABLE 4 
Principal Components Analysis of Recruitment and Screening Methods 
Component Eigenvalue Proportion
Cumulative 
Proportion 
Scoring Coefficients of First 
Principal Component 
Recruitment Methods 
1 2.37 0.24 0.24 0.27 
2 1.21 0.12 0.36 0.22 
3 1.03 0.10 0.46 0.31 
4 0.94 0.09 0.56 0.29 
5 0.91 0.09 0.65 0.44 
6 0.83 0.08 0.73 0.26 
7 0.80 0.08 0.81 0.48 
8 0.71 0.07 0.88 0.39 
9 0.70 0.07 0.95 0.23 
10 0.49 0.05 1.00 0.11 
Screening Methods 
1 1.64 0.24 0.24 0.32 
2 1.17 0.17 0.40 0.22 
3 1.05 0.15 0.55 0.48 
4 0.96 0.14 0.69 0.53 
5 0.77 0.11 0.80 0.52 
6 0.74 0.11 0.91 0.27 
7 0.67 0.10 1.00 0.03 
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TABLE 5 
Statistically Significant Interactions and Their Main Effects:  Full Samplea,b 
 
X1 Variable 
 
X2 Variable 
 
∂PERF/∂X1
 
∂PERF/∂X2 
Interaction 
(d12) 
Recruitment Interactions 
Help Wanted Signs 
Private Employment 
Agency 
1.32 
(1.19) 
2.84 
(1.20)** 
-5.98 
(2.43)** 
Newspaper Current Employees 
-4.46 
(2.07)** 
-1.34 
(1.65) 
3.38 
(2.05)* 
Walk-ins 
State Employment 
Agency 
-5.84 
(1.27)** 
-2.38 
(1.93) 
3.64 
(2.05)* 
Walk-ins 
Private Employment 
Agency 
-5.34 
(1.04)** 
-1.34 
(1.80) 
4.19 
(2.04)** 
State Employment 
Agency 
School 
1.36 
(1.30) 
3.25 
(1.18)** 
-4.55 
(1.92)** 
State Employment 
Agency 
Union 
-0.07 
(1.06) 
-3.68 
(2.73) 
5.83 
(3.01)* 
Private Employment 
Agency 
Union 
1.72 
(1.07) 
-0.30 
(2.20) 
-7.42 
(3.75)** 
Screening Interactions 
Application Work Sample 
-3.09 
(0.08)** 
-1.23 
(0.11)** 
3.17 
(1.88)* 
Interview Work Sample 0.38 -2.38 5.00 
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(0.06)** (0.11)** (2.28)** 
Cross Interactions 
Private Employment 
Agency 
Application 
4.63 
(2.43)* 
-1.58 
(0.09)** 
-3.95 
(2.36)* 
Community 
Employment Agency 
Interview 
2.70 
(3.52) 
2.63 
(0.11)** 
-6.64 
(3.11)** 
Friends Interview 
3.40 
(2.42) 
2.27 
(0.13)** 
-3.90 
(2.22)* 
Newspaper 
Criminal Record 
Check 
-2.42 
(1.00)** 
0.22 
(0.10)** 
2.88 
(1.71)* 
Friends 
Criminal Record 
Check 
1.37 
(1.11) 
2.85 
(0.09)** 
-3.51 
(1.84)* 
Help Wanted Signs Test 
1.35 
(1.30) 
-0.29 
(0.11)** 
-3.92 
(2.02)* 
Current Employees Test 
-0.65 
(1.59) 
-4.09 
(0.11)** 
3.45 
(2.09)* 
Current Employees Work Sample 
1.72 
(1.51) 
6.88 
(0.09)** 
-6.67 
(2.06)** 
* p < .10  
** p < .05 
a Standard Errors are in parentheses.   
b Standard errors for derivatives with respect to recruitment methods are bootstrapped with 
1000 replications.  
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TABLE 6 
Statistically Significant Interactions and Their Main Effects:  High-Skilled Samplea,b
 
X1 Variable 
 
X2 Variable 
 
∂PERF/∂X1
 
∂PERF/∂X2 
Interaction 
(d12) 
Recruitment Method Interactions 
-1.79 -2.94 4.54 
Help Wanted 
Newspaper 
Advertisements (7.58) (4.35) (2.16)** 
2.85 -3.69 -3.92 
Help Wanted Walk-ins 
(7.58) (4.26) (2.33)* 
2.07 2.74 -7.04 
Help Wanted 
Private Employment 
Agency (7.58) (6.10) (2.93)** 
-5.74 -2.94 4.51 Newspaper 
Advertisements 
Current Employees 
(4.35) (4.66) (2.33)* 
-5.72 -2.64 6.56 
Walk-ins 
Private Employment 
Agency (4.26) (6.10) (2.33)** 
-3.16 2.26 -3.24 
Walk-ins Friends 
(4.26) (4.54) (1.97)* 
Screening Method Interactions 
-2.07 -5.24 4.19 
Interview Reference Check 
(0.25)** (0.21)** (2.47)* 
0.23 -2.01 4.34 
Criminal Record Check Test 
(0.14) (0.19)** (2.24)* 
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Recruitment/Screening Interactions 
-9.56 -2.58 6.09 
Walk-ins Interview 
(4.26)** (0.22)** (2.82)** 
-5.84 -3.37 5.66 
Current Employees Interview 
(4.66) (0.24)** (3.42)* 
3.87 2.98 -6.95 Community 
Employment Agency 
Interview 
(8.13) (0.24)** (3.96)* 
-10.81 0.72 8.48 
Union Referrals Interview 
(11.31) (0.23)** (4.78)* 
5.25 3.64 -6.34 
Friends Interview 
(4.54) (0.21)** (2.49)** 
-0.48 0.62 4.39 Private Employment 
Agency 
Education Check 
(6.10) (0.14)** (2.56)* 
1.88 0.45 -4.63 Help Wanted 
Advertisements 
Test 
(7.58) (0.20)** (2.28)** 
-3.31 -2.76 4.26 Newspaper 
Advertisements 
Test 
(4.35) (0.21)** (1.99)** 
0.20 -2.10 3.59 
School Referrals Test. 
(5.22) (0.22)** (2.15)* 
-5.36 -1.25 9.31 
Union Referrals Test 
(11.31) (0.19)** (4.86)* 
-1.27 3.18 -3.54 Newspaper 
Advertisements 
Work Sample 
(4.35) (0.13)** (1.82)* 
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0.38 5.00 -4.36 
Current Employees Work Sample 
(4.66) (0.12)** (2.26)* 
* p < .10  
** p < .05 
a Standard Errors are in parentheses.   
b Standard errors for derivatives with respect to recruitment methods are bootstrapped with 
1000 replications. 
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TABLE 7 
Statistically Significant Interactions and Their Main Effects:  Low-Skilled Samplea,b
 
X1 Variable 
 
X2 Variable 
 
∂PERF/∂X1
 
∂PERF/∂X2 
Interaction 
(d12) 
Recruitment Method Interactions 
-0.96 -0.45 -6.93 
Help Wanted 
Community 
Employment Agency (15.74) (18.41) (4.19)* 
-5.09 1.47 9.86 
Help Wanted School Referrals 
(15.74) (16.14) (3.52) ** 
-0.57 3.74 -10.51 Newspaper 
Advertisements 
Private Employment 
Agency (12.21) (15.50) (3.75) ** 
-2.98 -5.21 6.34 Newspaper 
Advertisements 
Community 
Employment Agency (12.21) (18.41) (3.55)* 
-1.13 -1.44 -12.23 Newspaper 
Advertisements 
Union Referrals 
(12.21) (33.82) (4.47) ** 
1.74 6.09 -9.32 
Walk-ins 
Private Employment 
Agency (11.42) (15.41) (4.32) ** 
-4.00 -13.77 15.35 
Current Employees 
Private Employment 
Agency (12.28) (15.41 (5.66) ** 
2.21 6.68 -6.67 State Employment 
Agency 
School Referrals 
(11.31) (16.14) (3.46)* 
Private Employment School Referrals 2.70 5.11 -9.41 
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Agency  (15.41) (16.14) (4.55) ** 
-0.24 2.55 -6.60 Community 
Employment Agency 
Friends 
(18.41) (11.47) (3.35)** 
-8.74 0.72 7.83 
Union Referrals Friends 
(33.82) (11.47) (4.38)* 
Screening Method Interactions 
7.27 13.48 -12.52 
Interview Reference Check 
(0.48)** (0.35)** (4.32)** 
-5.06 -10.76 10.90 
Interview Test 
(0.50)** (0.35)** (4.53)** 
-4.06 -8.61 11.45 
Interview Work Sample 
(0.46)** (0.41)** (5.21)** 
5.96 6.93 -8.92 
Reference Check 
Criminal Record 
Check (0.35)** (0.36)** (3.91)** 
2.02 -4.48 8.06 
Reference Check Work Sample 
(0.35)** (0.44)** (4.28)* 
4.40 1.90 -11.17 
Criminal Record Check Test 
(0.34)** (0.33)** (3.60)** 
Recruitment/Screening Interactions 
11.93 4.08 -13.63 State Employment 
Agency 
Application 
(11.31) (0.31)** (4.14)* 
8.20 5.37 -8.86 
Walk-ins Interview 
(11.42) (0.51)** (5.13)** 
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-6.86 -5.17 8.99 State Employment 
Agency 
Interview 
(11.31) (0.56)** (4.08)** 
14.60 4.35 -19.76 Community 
Employment Agency 
Interview 
(18.41) (0.49)** (5.28)** 
-5.83 -0.90 9.59 State Employment 
Agency 
Reference Check 
(11.31) (0.38)** (3.44)** 
3.28 5.48 -8.30 Community 
Employment Agency 
Reference Check 
(18.41) (0.40)** (3.96)** 
2.72 3.88 -7.64 State Employment 
Agency 
Criminal Record 
Check (11.31) (0.36)** (3.42)** 
-3.71 -1.71 13.53 Private Employment 
Agency 
Criminal Record 
Check (15.50) (0.44)** (4.23)** 
-0.29 2.82 -7.21 Community 
Employment Agency 
Criminal Record 
Check (18.41) (0.37)** (4.17)* 
-9.88 -0.26 11.95 
Union Referrals 
Criminal Record 
Check (33.82) (0.37) (5.45)** 
-2.35 -3.10 7.62 Private Employment 
Agency 
Test 
(15.50) (0.46)** (3.72)** 
1.04 1.66 -11.64 Community 
Employment Agency 
Test 
(18.41) (0.33)** (4.53)** 
-1.27 -4.91 7.64 
Walk-ins Work Sample 
(11.42) (0.45)** (3.78)** 
Current Employees Work Sample 2.29 16.86 -18.77 
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  (12.28) (0.42)** (5.11)* 
-0.73 3.26 -7.51 Community 
Employment Agency 
Work Sample 
(18.41) (0.44)** (4.50)* 
1.58 -3.08 11.16 
School Referrals Work Sample 
(16.14) (0.46)** (4.09)** 
-2.02 2.77 -20.53 
Union Referrals Work Sample 
(33.82) (0.40)** (7.80)** 
* p < .10  
** p < .05 
a Standard Errors are in parentheses.   
b Standard errors for derivatives with respect to recruitment methods are bootstrapped with 
1000 replications. 
